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DIGITAL ADVERTISING AND STATE-LEVEL POLITICAL ADVERTISING
DISCLOSURE SCHEMES AFTER MCMANUS
Tallman Trask *

ABSTRACT
Digital political advertising is a large and growing segment of political
advertising. Despite this, it remains largely unregulated. Attempts to regulate
digital political advertising have been state-based and have broadly fallen into two
models: a candidate or committee-based disclosure model which demands
disclosures from advertising purchasers, and a commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure model which requires disclosures from advertising sellers. The former
struggles to provide information to voters and advertising consumers that is not
already otherwise available and provides little benefit to regulators and enforcers;
the latter provides both additional information to voters and a clear enforcement
benefit to regulators. In 2018, Maryland established a commercial-advertiserbased disclosure model; this iteration of the model was quickly declared
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. However, applying the Supreme
Court’s campaign finance disclosure precedent to Washington’s long-standing
version of the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model leads to a different
outcome. While regulators and legislators should be conscientious when creating
and enforcing commercial-advertiser-based disclosure models, these schemes
appear to support the informational, enforcement, and anticorruption interests
described in the Supreme Court’s campaign finance precedent. The models thus
appear to fit within the limits of constitutionally acceptable campaign finance
disclosure laws.

*

University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. Thanks to Professor Lisa Manheim
for her thoughtful and insightful comments, and the editors who greatly improved this article with
the suggestions.
The author filed a regulatory complaint with the Public Disclosure Commission which led to
the Twitter case described in Part II.B. See Public Disclosure Commission Case 59521,
https://www.pdc.wa.gov/browse/cases/59521. Similarly, the author filed one of the two complaints
which led to the 2020 cases involving Facebook and Google described in Part II.B and discussed
in other sections. See Public Disclosure Commission Case 55351,
https://www.pdc.wa.gov/browse/cases/55351 (complaint against Facebook involving alleged
violations of RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050) and Public Disclosure Commission Case
59475, https://www.pdc.wa.gov/browse/cases/59475 (complaint against Google involving alleged
violations of RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050).
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INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has changed how advertisers reach potential customers.
Where broad-based television advertising and print advertising once dominated,
targeted online advertising has reimagined the way advertisers interact with
consumers. Contextual advertising, such as search engine keyword advertising,
allows advertisers to more efficiently reach consumers who may already be
interested in their products; behavioral advertising, such as social media
advertising, makes it simpler for advertisers to reach potential new customers at a
lower cost; and microtargeted advertising allows advertisers to reach only those
consumers whom they want to reach, and not the users who are unlikely to have an
interest in their products.1 Advertisers, seeing the potential benefits of new, more
targeted advertising, have shifted spending to online outlets.2 And advertisers
expect the market to continue to grow.3
Behavioral advertising, unlike contextual advertising, “works by collecting data
on a user's behavior on the Internet including browsing habits, search queries, and
web site viewing history” and then using that data to develop user profiles. These
use profiles can later be used to target advertising to specific consumers or
consumer groups.4 In its simplest form, behavioral advertising allows sites and
advertisers to reach users and consumers based on likely interests derived from
information users have shared with the sites and advertisers; in more complex
forms, it allows advertisers to reach users on one site or through one advertising
channel based on the behavior of those users on other sites. 5 Future versions of
behavioral advertising could, in theory, target users based on the behavior of related
users.6
These changes in advertising systems and the shift from offline to online
1
For a more extensive discussion of forms of online advertising, see FTC Staff, FTC Staff
Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, &
Technology, 2-10, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commiss
ion-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport
.pdf; see also NATIONAL ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, Understanding Online Advertising, https://ww
w.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
2
In 2016, online advertising surpassed television advertising as the top grossing advertising
outlet, with more than $72.5 billion in revenue. See INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, IAB
Internet Advertising Revenue Report: 2016 Full Year Results, 19, https://www.iab.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2016.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2021).
3
INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, 2021 Marketplace Outlook (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.iab.com/insights/2021-marketplace-outlook (“buyers are optimistic about 2021 and
expect a 6% overall increase in their 2021 budget”).
4
Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 899,
899 (2011); see also FTC Staff, Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to
Possible Self-Regulatory Principles, 2 (2007) (defining behavioral advertising as “the tracking of a
consumer’s activities online – including the searches the consumer has conducted, the web pages
visited, and the content viewed – in order to deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s
interests”).
5
Bennett, supra note 4, at 901-902.
6
Id. at 903-04.

2022]

POLITICAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURE AFTER MCMANUS

49

advertising have not gone unnoticed by political campaigns and advertisers. Early
online advertising systems allowed candidates and campaigns to reach voters in
new and unique ways.7 Contemporary online advertising has opened new doors to
candidates, and it allows candidates and campaigns who previously may have been
financially locked out of the advertising market to communicate with voters and
constituents in effective, meaningful ways.8 Large-scale data collection practices
and associated analysis practices appear to allow candidates and committees to
more effectively microtarget voters through online behavioral advertising and
predictive modeling, allowing campaigns to reach only those voters they believe
are likely to support them or to be undecided.9 In some cases, candidates and
campaigns may not even be fully aware of the targeting data used in relation to their
advertising because the extent of data collection and use by online commercial
advertisers is often opaque and buried under layers of algorithms and inaccessible
corporate data.10 While online political advertising spending has not yet surpassed
political television advertising spending, federal campaigns spent hundreds of
millions of dollars advertising online in 2020 alone.11 State and local races have
seen similarly large spending.12
Online advertising, and particularly behavioral advertising, demands a
significant amount of data about consumers and potential advertising viewers to be
effective. For an advertising purchaser to reach desired customer demographics,
either that purchaser or the commercial advertiser selling advertising needs to know
the demographic characteristics of specific users. The extensive data collection
required for effective online advertising has created notable privacy concerns
7

See Michael Cornfield & Kate Kaye, Online Political Advertising, POLITICKING ONLINE 163,
163-69 (Costas Panagopoulos ed., 2009) (describing the early forms and history of online political
advertising).
8
Erika Franklin Fowler, Michael M. Franz, Gregory J. Martin, Zachary Peskowitz & Travis N.
Ridout, Political Advertising Online and Offline, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 130, 133-134 (2021)
(noting that “the set of candidates who advertise on Facebook is much broader than those who
advertise on TV” and that for lower-resourced candidates, the efficiency of online advertising is
“the difference between advertising and not”); see also Barbara Ortutay & Amanda Seitz, Online
Political Ads: Cheap, Efficient and Ripe for Misuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/eef44be313efdefa959ec7d7200474cc
(targeted
online
political
advertising is “helpful for lesser-known candidates or smaller local and statewide campaigns that
can now spend as little as $250 to reach hundreds or thousands of voters online”).
9
For a discussion of the power and ubiquity of large-scale data and microtargeting in political
campaigns, see generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
861 (2014).
10
See, e.g., Sylvia Lu, Algorithmic Opacity, Private Accountability, and Corporate Social
Disclosure in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 23 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 99, 103-105, 119
(2020) (describing opaque algorithms and applying concerns to circumstances where consumers
“unknowingly trade their private information” in settings related to behavioral advertising and data
collection).
11
See Presidential General Election Ad Spending Tops $1.5 Billion, WESLEYAN MEDIA
PROJECT (Oct. 29, 2020), https://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/releases-102920.
12
In 2018, state-level and local candidates and committees in Washington State spent more
than $400,000 on Facebook advertising alone. See Washington State Public Disclosure
Commission, Expenditures, https://www.pdc.wa.gov/browse/more-ways-to-follow-the-money/
advanced-search/expenditures (choose “2018” from the dropdown labeled “Election Year”; enter
“Facebook” in the field labeled “Recipient Name”; then click “Filter”).
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among users and enforcers.13
Political advertising has not escaped the privacy concerns surrounding online
advertising more generally. The Cambridge Analytica scandal, where an
advertising and data firm accessed data about millions of Facebook users and used
that data as part of a campaign’s political advertising and communications efforts,
highlighted these privacy struggles.14 The potential impact and power of privacy
violations, which run alongside the online political advertising landscape, continues
to impact online advertising and data collection.15 In the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, privacy regulators imposed record fines on Facebook and
required new privacy practices.16 However, the “unquenchable thirst for more and
more data” that gave rise to the scandal remains, and data collection continues to
sit at the core of online advertising.17 This data collection, in fact, allows online
political advertising to engage in the kind of micro and hyper-targeted advertising
which allows candidates and campaigns to reach constituents and targeted voters.18
Coexistent with the privacy concerns embedded in behavioral advertising,
political advertising has legal transparency needs which simply do not apply to
other forms of advertising. For decades, laws and regulations have required
broadcasters to keep records of political advertising sales in publicly available “ad
books.”19 Online advertising is not automatically exempt from transparency
concerns and, although online commercial advertisers have attempted to create
internal or platform-specific transparency tools, these tools have sometimes
struggled to provide the transparency required by political advertising laws and
regulations.20 As a result, online commercial advertisers have faced fines and legal
13

See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook
(Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-sett
lement-facebook (describing privacy settlement requiring major online commercial advertiser to
change privacy practices).
14
For a description of the scandal, see Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole
Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign
.html; see also Patrick Day, Cambridge Analytica and Voter Privacy, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 583
(2020) (describing the scandal, the fallout, and proposed measures to prevent similar future
scandals).
15
See Day, supra note 14.
16
See, e.g., Tony Romm, FTC Votes to Approve $5 Billion Settlement with Facebook in Privacy
Probe, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/12/ftcvotes-approve-billion-settlement-with-facebook-privacy-probe.
17
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, In re Facebook, Inc., Fed. Trade
Comm’n File No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019).
18
See Bennett, supra note 4.
19
47 U.S.C.A. § 315(e); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233-43
(2003) (describing the “longstanding” recordkeeping requirements). For a description of what this
inspection looks like in practice, see Eli Sanders, Big Tech Is Failing to Comply with Seattle's Law
on Election Advertising Transparency, THE STRANGER (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.thestranger.
com/features/2017/12/20/25632083/big-tech-is-failing-to-comply-with-seattles-law-on-election-ad
vertising-transparency.
20
See Laura Edelson, Shikhar Sakhuja, Ratan Dey & Damon McCoy, An Analysis of United
States Online Political Advertising Transparency, 1-3 (New York University Working Paper, Feb.
12, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.04385.pdf. Note that, as a result of this research into political
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struggles, and legislatures and regulators have attempted to refine and revise
standards for the online era.21 These struggles have resulted in a fractured legal
environment, with little federal guidance, no nationally applicable standards, and
state approaches legal and regulatory structures which vary from laissez-faire
approaches lacking oversight to more stringent efforts mirroring federal
broadcaster recordkeeping and disclosure rules.
This fractured legal landscape creates the backdrop for two related state-level
legal and regulatory struggles: Maryland’s attempt to impose new standards on
online commercial advertisers when they sell political ads, and Washington’s
attempt to enforce longstanding political advertising disclosure laws, which were
originally drafted with more traditional commercial advertisers like newspapers or
radio stations in mind, where the commercial advertiser is an online commercial
advertiser with remarkably different practices from those more traditional
commercial advertisers This paper analyzes those struggles through the lens of
campaign finance regulation.
Part I provides a brief history of the state-regulation of political advertising as
applicable to political advertising disclosure. The section then proposes that
advertising disclosure regulations fall into two categories: a candidate-based model
or commercial-advertiser-based model. After defining the categories, the section
argues that, based on the normative assumptions of advertising disclosure laws and
campaign finance disclosure case law, the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure
model is a better fit and better meets the needs of disclosure law. Part II looks at
the state-level struggles in Maryland and Washington in more detail, and in the
context of campaign finance disclosure case law. The section particularly focuses
on the Supreme Court’s approach to disclosure laws, attempts in Washington to
enforce existing law against online commercial advertisers, and Washington Post
v. McManus, which found Maryland’s commercial advertiser disclosure law to be
unconstitutional. Part III applies Supreme Court precedent and campaign finance
case law to an analysis of Washington’s existing commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure model, arguing that the law is ultimately both constitutional and distinct
from Maryland’s more problematic approach.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE-LEVEL REGULATIONS

Following the Watergate scandal and associated revelations about campaign
behavior, state and federal lawmakers, alongside citizen advocates, sought to
address opaque campaign administration and campaign finance practices.22 The
advertising on Facebook and other research they carried out, Edelson and McCoy, potentially along
with others, had their access to Facebook and data about political advertising on the platform
suspended or revoked by Facebook on August 3, 2021. See David Gilbert, Facebook Just Suspended
the Accounts of Some of Its Biggest Critics, VICE, Aug. 4, 2021, https://www.vice.com
/en/article/n7bkg8/facebook-just-suspended-the-accounts-of-some-of-its-biggest-critics.
21
See discussion infra, Part I.A.
22
See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974) (creating the Federal Election Commission and further regulating federal campaign
activities); Washington Initiative 276 (Wash. 1972) (creating the Public Disclosure Commission

52

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:1

history of efforts to increase transparency at the federal level is well-documented
and studied by courts, academics, and journalists.23 A limited number of states have
undertaken regulatory efforts extending beyond the federal structure; other states,
however, have not put limits in place and have left digital campaign finance
regulation in the hands of industry self-regulation.24 In the absence of
comprehensive federal legislation addressing digital political advertising, 25 these
state-level efforts have become the focus of attempts to reign in the excesses of
digital political advertising spending. Broadly, the state-level models take one of
two approaches: they either regulate candidate and committee practices, or they
regulate commercial advertiser practices. Each model has benefits and drawbacks,
and they have vastly different legal impacts and disclosure potential.
A. Current State Approaches to Regulation
Campaign finance regulations typically address candidate and committee
behaviors. These laws generally impose specific disclosure and registration
requirements or create limits on fundraising. The laws may apply to candidates,
committees working in support of candidates and ballot measures, and outside
independent expenditure spending. At the state-level, these structures share a
common framework with federal campaign finance law.26 Certain state-level
regulatory frameworks require additional disclosures, and act on items beyond or
outside the scope of the federal regime. Required commercial advertiser disclosures
(that is, disclosures of political advertising required of advertising sellers, such as
newspapers, television and radio stations, or websites) are one such approach and
do not share a common core with the federal campaign finance system.
and regulating state campaign activities). See generally FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (1977),
https://transition.fec.gov/pdf/legislative_hist/legislative_history_1974.pdf. See also, JOHN C.
HUGHES, JOLENE UNSOELD: “UN-SOLD”, 23-33 (2016), https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/legacy
/who-are-we/jolene-unsoeld-pdf.pdf.
23
See, e.g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 115-132 (2003) (describing
the history of federal campaign finance regulation); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 585-91 (2011); and Jamie Fuller, From George
Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A Brief-ish History of Campaign Finance Reform, WASH. POST:
THE FIX (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/03/a-historyof-campaign-finance-reform-from-george-washington-to-shaun-mccutcheon.
24
See Robert Yablon, Political Advertising, Digital Platforms, and the Democratic Deficiencies
of Self-Regulation, 104 MINN. L. REV., headnotes 13 (2020).
25
Ellen Weintraub, The Law of Internet Communication Disclosures (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2019-12-18-The-Law-of-InternetCommunication-Disclaimers.pdf (highlighting the lack of federal “disclaimer regulations specific
to the internet” while noting that existing general disclosure requirements apply to online
advertising).
26
Compare, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30103(a) (requiring committees to “file a statement of
organization no later than 10 days after designation”), and 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (establishing a specific
timeline for the filing of “reports of receipts and disbursements” by committees), with RCW
42.17A.205(1) (requiring committees to “file a statement of organization with the commission . . .
within two weeks after organization”), and RCW 42.17A.235 (establishing a timeline for the filing
of “report[s] of all contributions received and expenditures” and other reports by committees).
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1. The Candidate-Based Model
The candidate-based disclosure model addresses online advertising by
affirmatively including online advertisements within other advertising disclosure
requirements. By affirmatively extending the requirements, legislatures have
created a statutory structure that mirrors the federal disclosure requirements, while
also avoiding the limitations of expanding a disclosure system through agency
opinions, interpretations, and guidance.27 However, the model has not typically
been used to purely extend disclosure requirements to new forms of advertising;
rather, the candidate-based disclosure model often imposes new requirements on
candidates and limits the liability or responsibility of online commercial
advertisers.
Candidate-based disclosure models specifically applicable to online advertising
exist in at least five states.28 While these disclosure requirements mirror
requirements for other forms of advertising, they do not require affirmative
disclosures of information from commercial advertisers and only mandate certain
in-advertising disclosure practices by campaigns. That is, the requirements extend
existing advertising requirements, like on-ad sponsorship and “top contributor”
requirements to online advertising, but do not impose additional online-specific
disclosure requirements.29 Typical practices included as part of the candidate-based
disclosure model involve notification requirements,30 placing the responsibility of
identifying political ads on the advertising purchaser,31 and “good faith” provisions
which allow platforms to avoid liability where purchasers fail to satisfy notification
requirements.32 In each state using a candidate-based disclosure model, commercial
advertisers are not required to disclose information they collect and the candidates
or committees purchasing political advertising are typically required to report their
expenditures to state regulators.
States with candidate-based disclosure models include New York, Virginia, and
California. Each state’s framework is a slight variation on the model described
above, and the differences typically limit, rather than extend, the disclosure
requirements associated with online political advertising. For example, while New
York law requires a regulatory body to define “online platform” to limit the
application of the law,33 California law plainly exempts a large swathe of online

27

See Weintraub, supra note 25.
See Ashley Fox & Victoria Ekstrand, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to
Disclose Sources of Online Political Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 74 (2021) (describing, in different
terms than those used here, state-level campaign finance disclosure structures).
29
See VA. H. 849 (2020) (explicitly extending existing requirements to online advertising). But
c.f. Cal. Gov. Code § 84504.6(c) (allowing for hyperlinks and other “clickable” features that allow
viewers to find sponsorship information on a different website).
30
See, e.g., Code of Virginia § 24.2-960 (requiring candidate disclosure to commercial
advertisers).
31
See id; see also, Laws of New York, § 14-107-B (requiring commercial advertisers to collect
state registration forms from committees).
32
See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 84504.6(b)(1).
33
N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-107-B(2).
28
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political advertising from the limited disclosure requirements the law imposes.34
Similarly, the legal structures within commercial-advertiser based models often
limit any possible liability for disclosure issues to campaigns, allowing commercial
advertisers to rely in “good faith” on the representations of advertising purchasers.35
Notably, this “good faith” exemption does not exist for offline commercial
advertisers in either California or Virginia, and the law therefore imposes more
stringent requirements for commercial advertisers who run political advertisements
offline than those who do so online.36 While the New York law does not absolve
online commercial advertisers of liability, the law does not require online-specific
disclosures, or even disclosures containing information which is not otherwise
available. Rather, the law requires online political advertising purchasers to merely
supply the commercial advertiser from whom they are purchasing the advertising
with the same registration form the purchaser has already filed with state regulators;
even then, commercial advertisers are not required to disclose information on those
forms available for public inspection or to disclose any information contained
within them.37 The candidate-based model thus creates a system which, while
similar to offline advertising disclosure requirements, may often allow online
commercial advertisers to escape liability and imposes disclosure requirements
exclusively on candidates.
2. The Commercial-Advertiser-Based Model
A limited number of states have established a system which uses a commercialadvertiser-based disclosure model.38 In contrast to a candidate-based model, a
commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model puts the disclosure onus on political
advertising sellers (newspapers, television and radio stations, websites and online
advertising sellers).39 These commercial advertiser disclosure requirements run in
parallel to candidate disclosures; that is, in states using the model, commercial
advertiser disclosures compliment rather than replace candidate disclosures.
Commercial-advertiser-based disclosure models rely on recordkeeping by
commercial advertisers. New Jersey requires that commercial advertisers “maintain
a record . . . [including] an exact copy of the communication and a statement of the
number of copies made or the dates and times that the communication was
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.3(h).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504(6)(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-960(2).
36
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-955 – 24.2-958.
37
N.Y. Elec. Law, § 14-107-B.
38
Currently, New Jersey and Washington are the only states making use of this model;
Maryland formerly and briefly made use of a model, but that law has since been declared
unconstitutional (see discussion infra., Part II.B.2); see also, Eli Sanders, Obama Appointee Who
Predicted Russian Interference Says Seattle Election Law Should Be National Model, THE
STRANGER (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/01/07/25684407/obama-appo
intee-who-predicted-russian-interference-says-seattle-election-law-should-be-national-model
(former FEC chair and others describe the commercial-advertisers-based model used in Washington
and Seattle as “unique” and suggest it should “be a model for other local governments”).
39
New Jersey and Washington both impose disclosure requirements on commercial advertisers
no matter the medium through which advertising is disseminated, while Maryland’s former law only
imposed disclosure requirements on online commercial advertisers.
34
35
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broadcast or otherwise transmitted, and the name and address of the committee,
group or individual paying for the communication.”40 Washington requires
commercial advertisers to maintain records which include at least “[t]he names and
addresses of persons from whom it accepted political advertising or electioneering
communications [;] . . . [t]he exact nature and extent of the services rendered; and
. . . [t]he total cost and the manner of payment for the services.”41 The disclosure
model also relies on information about political advertisements being made
available to the public by the commercial advertisers making records directly
available for public inspection; New Jersey requires that records are “available for
public inspection during normal business hours” and maintained for at least two
years following an election,42 while Washington requires that advertisers’ records
“shall be open for public inspection during normal business hours during the
campaign and for a period of no less than five years after the date of the applicable
election.”43 Inspection of records is allowed either at the commercial advertiser’s
place of business, or through another means provided for in the statutes or
regulations.44 Additionally, Maryland’s version of the commercial-advertiserbased disclosure model formerly required commercial advertisers to publish
disclosures on their website; the law has since been declared unconstitutional
(discussed in Part II.B below).45 Unlike the candidate-based disclosure model, no
state currently making use of a commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model has
included “good faith” or notification provisions in its law; the responsibility of
determining what is and is not political advertising subject to the state’s disclosure
requirements thus sits exclusively with the commercial advertiser.46
The commercial-advertiser-based model may require commercial advertisers to
disclose information beyond that which is disclosed, or potentially even known, by
candidates and advertising purchasers. For example, Washington’s disclosure
regime requires a “digital communication platform” acting as a commercial
advertiser to disclose a “description of the demographic information (e.g., age,
gender, race, location, etc.) of the audiences targeted and reached, to the extent such
information is collected by the commercial advertiser” alongside information about
the cost of the advertisement and payment for it.47 The regime, however, imposes
no such requirement on candidates and committees purchasing online political
advertising, instead only requiring them to disclose the “name and address of each
person to whom an expenditure was made . . . the amount, date, and purpose of

40

N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (2013).
RCW 42.17A.345(1).
42
N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (2013).
43
RCW 42.17A.345(1).
44
See WAC 390-18-050(3) (describing at least for acceptable forms of inspection); see also
N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (requiring only that records are “available for public inspection
during normal business hours”).
45
S.B. 875 Enrolled, 2018 Leg., 438 th Sess. (Md. 2018) (the “Online Electioneering
Transparency and Accountability Act”).
46
While neither New Jersey nor Washington includes either provision, Maryland’s former
disclosure law included a requirement that purchasers notify commercial advertisers that the
advertising was subject to the disclosure regime. See Md. S.B 875 Enrolled (2018).
47
WAC 390-18-050 (describing commercial advertiser disclosure requirements).
41
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each expenditure, and the total sum of all expenditures.”48
3. The Costs and Benefits of the Two Models
Disclosure regulations are often imposed to inspire public trust by codifying the
normative assumption that systems built on transparency and open public
information ought to be part of elections laws.49 Similarly, existing laws are built
on a framework of enforceability and serve as tools to root out malfeasance and
corruption.50 In each case, these laws strive to create a disclosure structure which
increases public trust in the fairness of elections through open and transparent
disclosure and enforcement actions against bad actors. Further, in creating these
structures, supporters have specifically and intentionally pointed to low “trust and
confidence in government institutions” created by “secrecy in government and the
influence of private money” as anathema to “our whole concept of democracy . . .
based on an informed and involved citizenry.”51 Thus, when looking at the costs
and benefits of the two models, the primary concern should be the ability of a model
to provide information (particularly information which increases public knowledge
and trust, and which provides additional actionable data to enforcers) and the ability
of a model to sanction and penalize bad actors. On those terms, the commercialadvertiser-based model has clear advantages.
While the explicit extension of on-ad disclosure rules under the candidate-based
model to online political advertising provides advertising consumers with an easy
and consistent means of accessing information on political ad spending in a way
which is familiar to those consumers, the model typically fails to provide additional
information to voters and the public.52 The New York model, for example, simply
48

RCW 42.17A.240(7).
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 1-201 (“the intention of this article is that the conduct
of elections should inspire public confidence and trust by assuring that . . . full information on
elections is provided to the public, including disclosure of campaign receipts and expenditures”);
See, e.g., RCW 42.17A.001 (“It is hereby declared by the sovereign people to be the public policy
of the state of Washington . . . [t]hat our representative form of government is founded on a belief
that those entrusted with the offices of government have nothing to fear from full public disclosure
[,] . . . the public's right to know of the financing of political campaigns and lobbying and the
financial affairs of elected officials and candidates far outweighs any right that these matters remain
secret and private [,] . . . [and] full access to information concerning the conduct of government on
every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance
of a free society”). Local and municipal campaign finance laws may extend beyond state and federal
laws in their scope but seek to achieve similar enforcement and disclosure goals. See, e.g., Seattle
City Council Ordinance 126306 (2020) (disclosure of information about the sources of funding for
communications “intended to influence legislation on political matters of local importance is vitally
important to the integrity of local elections”).
50
Id.; see N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-126 (defining disclosure law violations and penalties) and MD.
CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §§ 16-101-16-1004 (defining offenses and penalties under Maryland’s
elections laws, including disclosure laws).
51
Statement for Initiative Measure 276, in 1972 Washington General Election Voters Pamphlet,
at 10.
52
On-ad disclosure rules are those which require advertisers to include specific information,
like payer or donor information, either in print on a visual advertisement or as part of the content of
an audio advertisement.
49
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requires collection of information which is already otherwise available to the
public.53 In all cases, the candidate-based disclosure model makes little to no
additional information about election spending available to voters. The on-ad
disclosure rules which describe information commercial advertisers are required to
collect or candidates are required to provide only supply information already
captured through existing direct disclosure requirements.54
Similarly, the enforcement benefits of candidate-based disclosures are limited.
While there is some additional certification or notification requirement, these
requirements do little to encourage compliance from otherwise noncompliant
candidates and committees and do not function as means to support enforcement
because they provide no additional information to enforcers. The candidate-based
model rather assumes that candidates will, at most, provide accurate information to
commercial advertisers. However, enforcement efforts are unlikely to be furthered
by candidate-based disclosure models because there seems to be no reason to
believe that a candidate or committee, having already chosen to not disclose certain
advertising spending to state campaign finance authorities, would disclose the
political nature of advertising to a commercial advertiser. That is, disclosure
structures are only enforceable to the extent that they can capture information, and
where a model provides for no new information, it cannot provide for any
meaningful new enforcement power.55 In addition, candidate-based disclosure rules
often limit enforcement power because they cede too much ground to the existing
functional limits of online self-service advertising systems without considering the
normative and disclosure-driven impacts of the functionality of those systems. This
ceding often comes at the request of industry.56 Despite these systems coming
53

See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-107-B.
While on-ad disclosures serve an informative purpose, they do not make new information
available to the public, and rather typically require only the disclosure of information already
disclosed to regulators in candidate expenditure reports; that remains true in states with candidatebased models and commercial-advertiser-based models. See id.; see, e.g., RCW 42.17A.240
(defining required contents of expenditure and contribution reports); compare with RCW
42.17A.350 (defining on-ad contributor disclosure rules).
55
Any enforcement powers built into candidate-based models simply empower regulators to
enforce rules against candidates where candidates fail to follow technical requirements about the
disclosure of information to advertisers, although any information candidates are required to provide
to advertisers is already held by enforcers. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-107 and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24.2-960.
56
See, e.g., Comments of Google LLC Regarding the Washington Public Disclosure
Commission’s Proposed Permanent Rules On Political Advertising, GOOGLE, Sept. 21, 2018,
https://www.pdc.wa.gov/sites/default/files/form-index/Google%20PDC%20Com
ments%209.21.18%20.pdf (comments on a proposed Washington rule from Google, suggesting the
burden of identifying political ads should be on the buyer, not the commercial advertiser); Letter
from Christina Fisher, Exec. Director, TechNet Northeast, to Connecticut General Assembly Joint
Committee on Government Administration and Election, March 6, 2020, https://www.cga
.ct.gov/2020/GAEdata/Tmy/2020HB-05410-R000306-Fisher,%20Christina,%20Executive%20
Director,%20TechNet-TMY.PDF (comments on a failed Connecticut bill from TechNet, suggesting
commercial advertisers should be allowed to rely on information from ad buyers); Letter from John
Olson, Director, State Government Affairs Northeast Region, Internet Association to Connecticut
General Assembly Joint Committee on Government Administration and Election, March 6, 2020,
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/GAEdata/Tmy/2020HB-05410-R00030654
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online years or decades after the creation of at least some commercial advertiser
disclosure requirements which the systems are unable to appropriately manage,57
industry efforts to limit applicability and avoid liability continue.58
On balance, candidate-based disclosure models provide little public
transparency benefit and struggle to support government and social interests in
rooting out corruption through improper digital political ad spending because they
primarily repeat information which has already been disclosed. Further, they
provide no functional check on the accuracy of those disclosures. While extending
disclosure rules which require certain information to be included on or in
advertising to digital advertising certainly provides advertising consumers with
easily accessible information, the requirements do not typically provide voters with
new information or information which they could not otherwise access. Similarly,
and in the specific context of digital advertising, candidate-based disclosure models
are unable to provide enforcers, voters, and researchers with detailed information
about advertising targeting and spending which can help uncover unlawful and
improper attempts to target and influence specific constituent groups.59 The
candidate-based models are unable to provide that information because the
information is not held by candidates, but rather is maintained by commercial
advertisers.
In contrast, the commercial-advertiser-based model can provide the public with
additional information beyond candidate disclosures.60 The demographic and
targeting information could serve an important and informative disclosure function;
voters, typically unable to learn if candidates are engaging in objectionable
advertising practices, are suddenly able to access specific information about not just
what candidates and committees are saying to them, but what candidates and
Olsen,%20John,%20Director,%20Internet%20Association-TMY.PDF (comments on the same
Connecticut bill from the Internet Association, suggesting again that the burden of identifying
political ads should sit solely with the ad buyer). Indeed, the legislative history and testimony from
the bill’s patron suggests industry concerns were the driving motivations behind the substitute to the
original bill which added the “good faith” provision and additional liability limits; see Testimony
on Virginia House Bill 849 by Virginia Delegate Marcus Simon and a representative of Facebook,
http://virginia-senate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=3&clip_id=3105 at 2:24:24 –
2:31:27.
57
Facebook, one of the largest online commercial advertisers, was founded in 2004. Sarah
Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 25, 2007), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. In contrast, commercial advertiser disclosure laws
in Washington were created as part of Initiative 276, which passed in 1972. See “Election Search
Results,” https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=41&c=&c2=&t=&t2=5&p=&p
2=&y=; see also discussion infra., Part II.B; supra note 12.
58
See discussion infra., Part II and supra note 12.
59
For an example of the kind of digital advertising specific behavior which may be of interest
to regulators and voters, see Katie Benner, Glenn Thrush & Mike Isaac, Facebook Engages in
Housing Discrimination with Its Ad Practices, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/politics/facebook-housing-discrimination.html.
60
See, e.g., WAC 390-18-050(6)(g) (requiring digital commercial advertisers to disclose, in
their publicly inspectable books, “[a] description of the demographic information (e.g., age, gender,
race, location, etc.) of the audiences targeted and reached” and “the total number of impressions
generated by the advertisement,” information which is either unavailable to candidates and
advertising purchases, not required to be disclosed by candidates and advertising purchases, or
both).
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committees are saying to other voters and who they are saying it to. This kind of
disclosure serves a particularly important informative function for digital political
advertising, where microtargeting is “wreaking havoc.”61 These microtargeted ads,
which allow candidates and committees to segment audiences and “target based on
people’s interests and demographics,”62 make it more difficult for the public to hold
politicians accountable and access full information about advertising because
microtargeting all but ensures that at least some voters will never see at least some
ads purchased during an election. Similarly, journalists seeking to investigate
claims made during campaigns and to inform the public about the veracity of those
claims may find themselves struggling to access the ads and information about
them.63 This difficultly is particularly evident when microtargeted ads are
compared to traditional ads in newspapers and on televisions, which do not allow
candidates to exempt groups in the same way. Commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure models tell the public about and allow the public to see advertising,
including advertising that they might otherwise not be aware of. Candidate-based
models do not and cannot replicate this.
Under the commercial-advertiser-based model, commercial advertiser
disclosures also require disclosure of the cost of the advertising sold.64 This cost
requirement serves as an important check on candidate disclosures which can help
regulators uncover bad acts and improper candidate disclosures.65 Because
commercial advertisers are required to disclose their records about candidate
spending under a commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model, and these
disclosure sit alongside required candidate disclosures the public and enforcement
bodies are able to confirm candidate disclosures and more fully track advertising
throughout the election universe. Similarly, because commercial advertisers are
required to disclose information about political advertising and in some cases to
independently identify political advertising, commercial advertiser disclosure
requirements enable the public and enforcers to identify political advertising
purchasers who have failed to follow disclosure requirements, including failures to
follow state-level registration and reporting requirements.
A hypothetical may be helpful to further highlight the difference between the
two models and the benefits of the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model
over the candidate-based disclosure model. Imagine an election where there are two
advertising purchasers: a candidate and an unrelated committee. Further, imagine
that neither has fully disclosed its advertising expenditures to state regulators, and
61
Barbara Ortutay & Amanda Seitz, How Microtargeted Political Ads are Wreaking Havoc on
Our Elections, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story
/2020-02-01/how-microtargeted-political-ads-are-wreaking-havoc-on-our-elections.
62
Kail Lembe & Becca Ricks, The Basics on Microtargeting and Political Ads on Facebook,
MOZILLA FOUNDATION (Jan. 14, 2020), https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/blog/basics-micro
targeting-and-political-ads-facebook.
63
See Ortutay & Seitz, supra note 61.
64
E.g., RCW 42.17A.345(1)(c); WAC 390-18-050(5)(c).
65
See comments of Public Disclosure Commission Executive Director Peter Levelle at Virtual
Work Session: Online Political Advertising and Regulation of Contributions to SuperPACs Before
the Washington State State Government, Tribal Relations & Elections Committee, 2020 Leg., Dec.
2, 2020, https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2020121010 (comments between 00:00:5500:36:39).
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the committee has failed to file any reports or to follow the applicable committee
registration requirements. In a candidate-based model, the public and regulators
would struggle to identify the deficiencies in the candidate’s filings because the
candidate’s reported expenditures are the only evidence of any spending and there
is no means to confirm the accuracy of those filings. In the same vein, the public
and regulators may be entirely unable to easily access any information about the
committee’s purchases or to discover any information about the committee without
extensive investigation. They would also almost certainly be unable to discover that
information prior to election day. In a commercial-advertiser-based model,
however, the public and regulators could easily discover the deficiencies in the
candidate filings by simply comparing the candidate’s filings with commercial
advertiser records. Similarly, the public and regulators would be able to easily find
information about the committee in a state using a commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure model because specific information about the committee is held in the
public records of the commercial advertiser.
The struggles in the committee example are even further highlighted by the ease
of purchasing microtargeted digital advertising through self-service platforms like
those offered by Facebook and Google. Unlike forms of advertising which
necessarily require some personal interaction between purchaser and seller, selfservice digital advertising requires no such thing. As a result, individuals seeking
to influence elections can, if they so desire, purchase advertising and possibly avoid
meaningful interaction with a representative of the seller, and thus avoid the kind
of disclosure and record scrutiny involved in campaign finance disclosure systems.
Self-service digital advertising systems make it simpler for bad actors to purchase
political advertising, display it to a subset of the electorate, and avoid disclosure to
regulators. Accordingly, commercial-advertiser-based disclosure requirements are
the only way states have found to avoid the enforcement and compliance problems
created by the ease of purchasing microtargeted digital political advertising, and
thus have clear advantages over candidate-based disclosure requirements.
II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SURROUNDING THE MODELS

Candidate disclosure requirements have been considered by courts for at least
forty years, starting with Buckley v. Valeo.66 The long-standing campaign finance
disclosure case law shows that candidate-based disclosure requirements are
constitutional. Commercial-advertiser-based models, however, have only rarely
been considered, and there is only one appellate court decision on their
constitutionality.67 Even where the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model
has been used for decades, there are only a small number of state court decisions
addressing the model and no state supreme court decisions directly on the
constitutionality of the disclosure requirements and model.68

66

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
68
See discussion infra., Part II.B.1.
67
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A. Courts and Campaign Finance Disclosure
Case law on campaign finance disclosure requirements, and particularly the
kinds of third-party disclosure rules imposed by the commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure model, is limited. However, campaign finance cases and the limited
discussion of campaign finance disclosure within them helps define the confines of
the law and legislative efforts to impose specific limits. While long-standing
campaign finance case law at least suggests that many or most well-tailored,
candidate-based disclosure requirements are constitutional, the same series of cases
also suggests that, in at least some cases, commercial-advertiser-based disclosure
requirements are constitutional.
1. Buckley v. Valeo
Buckley v. Valeo remains at the core of campaign finance conversations.69 The
Buckley Court’s approach to campaign finance contribution and spending limits,
under which contributions and expenditures are treated differently and the former
is subject to both a less strict form of scrutiny and more closely related to the
government interest in preventing corruption, continues to influence campaign
finance cases.70 While the disclosure portion of Buckley remains as much in place
as the contribution and expenditure portions, it is less regularly the focus of
campaign finance reform discussions.71
Buckley was the Court’s first look at modern campaign finance disclosure
rules.72 The Buckley approach to disclosure requirements demands viewing the
requirement through the lens of “compelled disclosure, [which] in itself, can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”73 While “significant encroachments” like disclosure requirements
demand more than “a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest,”
some interests are “sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of
infringement.”74 Disclosure requirements like those at question in Buckley,

69

See Burt Neuborne, Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, at 18-19 (1998); Richard L. Hasan, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in ELECTION LAW
STORIES (2016).
70
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
71
But c.f., Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33
AKRON L. REV. 71, 78-83 (1999) (describing campaign finance disclosure cases after Buckley).
72
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 62, 80 (describing how the statute required committee
registration and imposed contribution and expenditure “reporting obligations on ‘political
committees’ and candidates” alongside certain requirements on “individuals and groups that are not
candidates or political committees,” upholding the later (not discussed above) only after construing
the requirements as limited to “contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or
requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee,
and . . . expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate”).
73
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64 (referencing, among others, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958)).
74
Id. at 67-66.
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however, are substantial.75
While Buckley provides that corruption prevention is the only valid justification
of contribution limits,76 there are three “sufficiently important” government
interests which can justify disclosure requirements. First, disclosure serves an
informative function which can empower voters and provide them with
information, relevant to voting, which may not otherwise be accessible.77 Second,
disclosure requirements serve to further the anticorruption and anti-appearance-ofcorruption interests of contribution limits by exposing those contributions to the
public.78 Third, disclosure requirements like those in Buckley “are an essential
means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations” of the contribution limits
which serve to more directly prevent corruption and the appearance of it.79 As a
result of these three sufficiently important and substantial interests, disclosure rules
generally serve important government interests.80
The burdens imposed, however, are “not insignificant . . . and they must be
weighed carefully against the interests” advanced and supported by the disclosure
rules.81 The Court, in examining three specific burdens, found “no constitutional
infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure” requirements.82
Specifically examining non-candidate and committee reporting requirements, the
Court pointed out once again that “disclosure serves informational functions, as
well as the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of the contribution
limitations” and held that these interests justify the burdens imposed on
contributors.83 Similarly, “the substantial public interest in disclosure identified”
outweighs any potential disclosure-based harm to minor parties despite the
potential “damage done by disclosure to the associational interests.”84 And, where
non-candidate and committee disclosure requirements are “reasonable and
minimally restrictive,” not only do they not violate the First Amendment interests
of the discloser, but they “further[] First Amendment values by opening the basic
processes of our federal election system to public view.”85 Thus, the “disclosure
75

Id. at 66, 68.
Id. at 25-29. For a proposed method of regulating campaign finance that seeks to avoid a
corruption-based justification for regulation in the wake of Citizens United and the quid pro quo
definition of corruption imposed therein, see Eugene D. Mazo, The Disappearance of Corruption
and the New Path Forward in Campaign Finance, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 259, 298-312
(2014).
77
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 66-67.
78
Id. at 67 (quoting Louis D. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT, 92 (Fredrick A. Stokes Co., 1914) (1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.”)).
79
Id. at 67-68.
80
Id. at 68.
81
Id. at 68.
82
Id. at 68-85 (discussing asserted burdens based on the impact on minor parties, non-candidate
and non-committee aggregate disclosure rules, and overbreadth of the reporting requirements which,
appellants claimed, extended to cover contributions so low that they could not relate to anticorruption interests).
83
Id. at 83.
84
Id. at 71-72.
85
Id. at 81-82.
76
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requirements . . . in most applications appear to be the least restrictive means of
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption.”86
Though the analysis in Buckley is limited to disclosure requirements imposed
on political actors (that is, on candidates, committees, and people directly engaged
in making expenditures and contributions) and not on third parties like commercial
advertisers, the foundational framework can still provide guidance for commercialadvertiser-based disclosure requirements. There is not, for example, any indication
that the informational interest furthered by disclosure rules is limited exclusively to
direct disclosures; the interest is not in the source of the disclosure, but in the nature
and publicity of the information itself.87 In the same way, the enforcement interests
described are not limited to enforcement against the party making the disclosure
and rather the enforcement interests implicitly sit within “gathering the data” to
uncover violations and enforce campaign finance against violators.88 That
enforcement interest has no logical core if it does not extend to enforcement against
parties other than the discloser and at least part of the information necessary for
enforcement can only be found in disclosures by other parties because some
violations are contained within disclosure failures.89
2. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Decades later, the Court returned to disclosure issues while examining the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.90 Within a wide-reaching look at the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulation, the Court closely approached consideration of

86

Id. at 68.
See id. at 67 (the informational value sits in “exposing large contributions and expenditures
to the light of publicity” because a “public armed with information about a candidate's most
generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in
return” and referencing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“informed
public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment”)). See also Lear Jiang, Note,
Disclosure's Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the “Informational Interest” Advanced by Campaign
Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 491-500 (2019) (describing the informational interest
and case law involving the interest).
88
See id. at 67-68.
89
In a concrete example, Washington initiative promoter Tim Eyman was recently found to
have violated state campaign finance laws by failing to register as a political committee and
arranging what amounted to a kickback scheme. Eyman’s violations were, at least in part, revealed
through disclosures filed by political committees, and the enforcement interest in disclosures was
not exercised purely against the committees who had filed the disclosures, but also against Eyman.
While the specifics of state disclosure law differ somewhat from federal disclosure requirements,
the framework of the law is similar and the interests at the core of the case are the same as the
disclosure discussion in Buckley. See Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Washington
v. Eyman, No. 17-2-01546-34 (Thurston Co. Superior Ct., Feb. 10, 2021), Public Disclosure
Commission Case #15-078, and David Gutman, Tim Eyman Violated Campaign Finance Law,
Judge Rules, is Barred from Controlling Political Committees, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/tim-eyman-found-liable-on-campaign-financeviolations-barred-from-controlling-political-committees.
90
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
87
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commercial-advertiser-based disclosure systems.91 While the statute and
regulations were housed within the authority of the Federal Communications
Commission, and not the Federal Election Commission or campaign finance and
ethics regulators, the Court relied on the same kinds of interests as expressed in
Buckley. The BCRA broadcaster disclosure requirements serve an enforcement
interest as they “provide an independently compiled set of data for purposes of
verifying candidates' compliance with the disclosure requirements and source
limitations.”92 The data-set contained within the records is “necessary to permit
political candidates and others to verify that licensees have complied with their
obligations.”93 However, the Court left open the possibility that some forms of
disclosures which go beyond the “disclosure of names, addresses, and the fact of a
request” may raise constitutional questions beyond those raised by BCRA.94
While McConnell significantly relies on the long-standing history of
broadcaster regulation and related disclosure requirements and the broad powers of
the Federal Communications Commission,95 the case’s core is applicable to
commercial advertiser disclosure rules more generally. It is difficult to see how, for
example, agency rules imposed on a television station which require the station to
maintain and make available certain records about political advertising are
constitutional unless there is not at least the strong potential that other agency rules
or statutes imposed on advertisers accepting political advertising more generally
are also constitutional. That is, the logic of McConnell, in isolation, is the closest
look at something similar to commercial-advertiser-based disclosure from the
Supreme Court and it seems to suggest the commercial-advertisers-based
disclosure structure, where properly designed and limited, may fit well within the
limits of constitutionality.
3. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
BCRA’s disclosure requirements were again considered in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.96 As in Buckley and McConnell before, the Court
91

See id. at 233-246 (opinion of Breyer, J.). The broadcaster disclosure statute considered in
McConnell require broadcasters “keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting
requests,” where politically related broadcasting requests consist of advertising requests from
candidates, requests involving messages referencing candidates, or requests about certain political
issues. The implemented rules, at the time the Court considered them, required broadcasters keep
the records along with information about if the request was granted and, if so, the cost of the
advertising and information about when the advertising was broadcast. See and compare discussion
supra Part I.A.2.
92
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 237.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 243; see also id. at 363 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that BCRA’s disclosure
rules may allow “candidates and political groups the opportunity to ferret out a purchaser's political
strategy” in such a way which “ultimately, unduly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of
purchasers”).
95
See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. at 236 (“Compared to these
longstanding recordkeeping requirements” the requirements imposed by BCRA and the associated
burdens are “a small drop in a very large bucket.”)
96
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 366-371.
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found that the disclosure requirements are “a less restrictive alternative to more
comprehensive regulations of speech.”97 While these disclosure requirements may
place some potential burden on speech, they do not themselves prevent speech.98
Further, the “informational interest alone is sufficient” to justify the application of
the disclosure requirements to Citizens United’s advertising.99 That is, the
transparency embedded in disclosures expresses an important interest in
“enabl[ing] the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.”100 As the BCRA disclosure requirements forward
an important interest and present only a limited burden, the Court held the
requirements were constitutional.101
Rejecting an argument that disclosure requirements may “chill donations to an
organization by exposing donors to retaliation,” the Court reasoned that, while a
disclosure requirement would “be unconstitutional as applied to an organization if
there were a reasonable probability that the group's members would face threats,
harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed,” there must be actual
evidence of risk.102
4. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta
State efforts to regulate charitable disclosures also play a role in commercial
advertiser disclosure rules. As considered in Americans for Prosperity Foundation
v. Bonta, California statutes and regulations required that charitable organizations
file copies of certain tax filings with the state’s attorney general.103 The Court, in
considering the requirement, addressed the standards for review of the
constitutionality of compelled disclosures more generally, and the level of scrutiny
applicable in that review. Americans for Prosperity Foundation meaningfully does
not decide if the heightened or exacting scrutiny described in the Buckley line of
cases applies universally to cases involving compelled disclosures.104
97

Id. at 369.
Id. at 366 (referencing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64 and McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. at 201).
99
Id. at 369.
100
Id. at 371.
101
See id. at 371. But c.f., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 480 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part) (“[t]he disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements . . . are also
unconstitutional”).
102
Id. at 370 (2010); see also, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (upholding
disclosure of information about petition signatories where there is not direct proof of risk).
103
Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. ___ (2021); see also Cal. Govt. Code
§12584 (describing statutory filing requirements); Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 11, §301 (describing a
requirement for charitable organizations to file “Internal Revenue Service Form 990, 990-PF, 990EZ, or 1120, together with all attachments and schedules as applicable, in the same form as filed
with the Internal Revenue Service” in order to comply with Cal. Govt. Code §12584).
104
See Americans for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 7 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing a
preference for holding Buckley’s exacting scrutiny to be applicable in all compelled disclosure
cases), at 1 (Opinion of Thomas, J.) (describing, alone, a desire to find that strict scrutiny is
applicable in all compelled disclosure cases), at 2 (Opinion of Alito, J.) (seeing “no need to decide”
between strict and exacting scrutiny in this case), and at 8-9 (Opinion of Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
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However, wherever exacting scrutiny does apply,105 the law must be narrowly
tailored to meet state interests.106 The narrow tailoring requirement ensures that
exacting scrutiny analysis has “real teeth.”107 The requirement, however, does not
“require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their
ends.”108 Instead, the narrow tailoring requirement merely demands that “where
exacting scrutiny applies [in compelled disclosure cases], the challenged
requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes.”109 Because even
an indirect chilling effect on First Amendment activity can imperil the “breathing
space” necessary for the survival of First Amendment freedoms, the compelled
disclosure laws must be narrowly tailored even where the bear a “substantial
relation to an important interest.”110
5. Other Cases
In addition to cases directly considering campaign finance disclosure issues,
courts have addressed related concerns both before and after Buckley. In Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., the Court found that
certain kinds of extensive corporate disclosure requirements may “impose
administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear” while also
requiring complex organizations to ensure obligations can be met, and thus could
limit the political expression of smaller groups.111 Comparing the benefits, the
Court held that the burdens imposed on those organizations by the extensive and
complex disclosure regime could not be justified where the “state interest in
disclosure . . . can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply
of regulations.”112 Similarly, disclosure requirements have failed to meet the
standards required by exacting scrutiny where they are designed for some purpose
outside the anticorruption, informational, and enforcement interests expressed in
Buckley.113
Disclosure requirements have also been limited, on freedom of association
grounds, where they present a risk to individuals whose information would be
(describing a preference for the “more flexible approach,” i.e. exacting scrutiny, without joining
Roberts in preferring to hold it applicable in all compelled disclosure cases).
105
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989) (interpreting narrowly tailored
to means that a regulation is “not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's
interest” even if “government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative”).
106
Americans for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 9.
107
Id. at 1 (Opinion of Alito, J.)
108
Id. at 9.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 9-10 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
111
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 (1986).
112
Id. at 262. But c.f., Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
265-266 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (describing concerns the majority is moving away
from Buckley and expressing view that any burdens here do not result from the disclosure
requirements, but other portions of the law).
113
See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (holding that disclosure
requirements “designed to implement . . . asymmetrical contribution limits” violated the First
Amendment).
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disclosed. In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, the Court
considered a state law requiring “every political party to report the names and
addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements” as
applied to a minor political party.114 Describing “proof of specific incidents of
private and government hostility toward the [minor party] and its members,” the
Court pointed to Buckley’s proposed exemption for minor parties where disclosure
may subject members and supporters “to threats, harassment, or reprisals from
either Government officials or private parties.”115 Similarly, disclosure of
members’ names may violate the right to freedom of association more generally.
Indeed, “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may
constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association” as more express
limits.116 Demands and requirements for the disclosure of membership lists
generally, therefore, fit within a “strict test” and the same “exacting scrutiny” as
campaign finance disclosures, requiring a “relevant correlation” between the
information to be disclosed and the state’s substantial interest in that information.117
The strictness does not result from the direct impact of the disclosure, but from the
unintended yet inevitable impact of the disclosure, even where the government
action may “appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.”118
Alongside these associational limits on disclosure, some bans on anonymous
political speech have also been found to be unconstitutional. In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, the Court found the “simple” informational interest “in
providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise
omit.”119 Rather, the information interest was “plainly insufficient to support” the
requirement that political handbills contain information about the sponsor.120
Distinguishing Buckley, the Court found that the Ohio statute’s “infringement on
speech [is] more intrusive” because “even though money may ‘talk,’ its speech is
less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill.”121
However, public disclosure of associational information related to political
efforts is not entirely outside the scope of proper and constitutional disclosures.
Information about ballot measure petition signatories may, for instance, be
disclosed where public records laws apply.122 As “public disclosure of referendum
petitions in general is substantially related to the important interest of preserving
the integrity of the electoral process” and related burdens are “only modest,” the
disclosure of information about petition signers does not run counter to the First
Amendment in general.123
114

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
Id. at 93, 99 (1982) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976)).
116
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
117
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-66 (discussing and describing NAACP v. Alabama).
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NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-62.
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
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Id. at 349.
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Id. at 355-56.
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See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
123
Id. at 199-201 (leaving open the possibility that specific disclosure may violate the rights of
specific signers).
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Federal disclosure laws have also been upheld as they apply to lobbying
activities.124 In terms similar to existing campaign finance disclosure rules, the
statute considered in Harriss demanded “reports to Congress from every person
‘receiving any contributions or expending any money’ for the purpose of
influencing the passage or defeat of any legislation by Congress.”125 Finding that
these rules were intended to require “disclosure of . . . direct pressures, exerted by
the lobbyist themselves or through their hirelings or through an artificially
stimulated letter campaign,” the Court held that Congress is “not constitutionally
forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities.”126 Rather, Congress is
empowered to require disclosure of information about “the myriad pressures” with
which they are presented in order to protect itself and “safeguard a vital national
interest.”127 The use of this power is not made unconstitutional simply because the
particular form may, in some imaginable set of circumstances, have a limited
deterrent effect on potential speech. That is, even where people may “remain silent
because of fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply” with lobbying
disclosure laws, Congress can act to require those disclosures even when doing so
may create some “indirect [restraint] resulting from self-censorship, comparable in
many ways to the restraint resulting from criminal libel law.”128
State-level disclosure requirements about financial contributions to ballot
measures have also been considered. For example, when considering small
contributions and expenditures related to a ballot measure committee in Sampson
v. Buescher, the 10th Circuit concluded that, where the cost of compliance exceeded
the total contributions to the effort, “the governmental interest in imposing [the
disclosure requirements within Colorado’s constitution and related statutes] is
minimal, if not nonexistent, in light of the small size of the contributions.”129
However, the holding was limited to the facts of the as-applied challenge and did
not create a “bright line below which a ballot-issue committee cannot be required
to report contributions and expenditures.”130 Rather, wherever the point at which
small contribution size ensured the burden exceeded the benefit sat, the
contributions here were “well below the line.”131 In the same manner, the Ninth
Circuit found that, where contributions and expenditures were solely small in-kind
contributions to a ballot measure campaign, the benefits offered by disclosure could
not overcome the burdens imposed by disclosure requirements.132 As in Sampson,
the Court here was limited and did not “purport to establish a level above de
minimis at which a disclosure requirement for in-kind expenditures for ballot issues
passes constitutional muster” while holding the small contributions at question
were below the limit at which disclosure did not impose burdens beyond the
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See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
Id. at 614.
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Id. at 620, 625.
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Id. at 625, 626.
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Id. at 626.
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Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1030-34 (9th Cir. 2009).
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benefits.133
In neither case did the court express any view about the constitutionality of
disclosure requirements in general, or even as they relate to ballot measure
campaigns.134 In examining the latter issue more assertively, the 9th Circuit found
that, where the state has a “sufficiently compelling informational interest,”
disclosure of information about ballot measure funding may be appropriate.135
However, in more completely analyzing the issue nine years later in Family PAC
v. McKenna, the court pointed to “an important (and even compelling)
informational interest in requiring ballot measure committees to disclose
information about contributions” in support of ballot measure disclosure
requirements.136 The modest burden disclosure requirements imposed on ballot
measure committees and supporters are overwhelmed by the “interest in informing
the electorate about who is financing ballot measure committees.”137 Thus, the court
held the disclosure requirements, as they apply to ballot measure committees, meet
the exacting scrutiny standards.138
The 2nd Circuit, in considering a novel Vermont disclosure regulation which
required all individuals and groups sponsoring political advertising involving a
candidate send that candidate (and only the candidate) a copy of the advertisement
along with certain information about the advertisement, found the requirement
supported the state’s informational interest.139 The requirement, the court reasoned,
furthers the informational interest by “encourage[ing] candidate response” and
helping to “ensure that candidates are aware of and have an opportunity to take a
position on the arguments being made in their name.”140 While the court suggested
the informational interest advanced by disclosure to candidates is analogous to the
informational interest in disclosures to the public at large, it is not clear if this
contention squares cleanly with the informational interest as expressed in prior
cases.141

133

Id. at 1034.
Ballot measure campaigns are different than other political efforts; they do not fit neatly into
the framework built around candidate disclosure requirements because quid pro quo corruption is
impossible where there is no candidate. However, the difference is not applicable when considering
advertising disclosure regulations because the difference sits within disclosures about donations and
donors and not disclosures about advertising or expenditures. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Commission, 514 U.S. at 356 (suggesting that the corruption interest relevant to candidate
disclosures does not exist, or is at least lessened relative to candidate elections, in ballot measure
and referenda elections).
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Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Id. at 808.
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Id. at 811.
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Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC II), 758 F.3d 118, 134 (2d. Cir., 2014).
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Id.
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Id. But c.f., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 66-67 (describing the informational interest as
resting within the provision of information to voters); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. at 369 (suggesting the informational interest exists because the “public has an interest in
knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”).
134

70

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:1

B. Courts and the Commercial-Advertiser-Based Disclosure Model
Case law on the commercial advertiser disclosure limits is significantly limited.
The Supreme Court has never considered a case on commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure models, and federal courts have only considered the requirements once.
While state courts have considered the model, they have only done so rarely and
recently. Even in the two states which currently impose commercial-advertiserbased disclosure requirements, case law is limited. Before 2018, there is no reported
case on the requirements in Washington, and there is no record of a case considering
New Jersey’s requirements.
1. Recent Washington Cases
Following data privacy concerns and allegations of online interference with the
2016 election, Washington journalists and activists began to reexamine the power
of the state’s commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model and how it and laws
related to it could be used to explore online political influence and advertising.142
These efforts have led to at least eight complaints addressed to state regulators each
with an associated investigation; these investigations ultimately resulted in five
lawsuits, and four settlements.143 To date, no case involving the Washington
requirements has been tried. However, a brief overview of the three settled lawsuits
and one outstanding lawsuit helps clarify the kinds of allegations facing companies
and the enforcement efforts involved.
a. The 2018 Cases
Following complaints against Facebook and Google, the State of Washington
filed suit against the companies in June of 2018 alleging violations of state
campaign finance disclosure laws and the state’s commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure model.144 Neither case, however, made it to trial, with both companies
settling prior. Facebook settled on December 14, 2018, agreeing to pay a total of
$238,500 while “not admitting to any violation of the law” and “expressing their

142
See, e.g., Eli Sanders, We're Asking the Tech Giants to Comply with Seattle's Law on
Political Ad Transparency. Will They?, THE STRANGER (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.thestranger
.com/slog/2017/12/04/25606100/were-asking-the-tech-giants-to-comply-with-seattles-law-onpolitical-ad-transparency-will-they. See also Public Disclosure Case #34055 (Washington activist
Connor Edwards’ 2018 complaint against Facebook) and Public Disclosure Case #34060 (Edwards’
2018 complaint against Google).
143
The complaints and cases are Public Disclosure Commission Cases #34055, #34060,
#41024, #47572, #48424, #55351, #59475, #59521. The settled lawsuits were filed against
Facebook, Twitter, and twice against Google. An additional lawsuit against Facebook is still
outstanding as of July 1, 2021.
144
Washington v. Facebook, King County Superior Court 18-2-14129-0 (2018), and
Washington v. Google, King County Superior Court 18-2-14130-3 (2018). See also Washington v.
Facebook, 2018 WL 5617145 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (remanding the case to state court following
Facebook’s attempt to remove the case on questionable diversity grounds).
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commitment to transparency in campaign finance and political advertising.”145
Similarly, on December 17, 2018, Google settled, agreeing to pay a total of
$217,000 while “expressly den[ying] all material allegations” involved in the
case.146
Notably, Google also amended its policies in June of 2018 to prohibit further
political advertising in purchases related to Washington elections.147 This
prohibition mirrored a similar prohibition imposed by Google in Maryland.148
Facebook also prohibited future political advertising purchases related to
Washington elections, banning the purchases after the 2018 case settled.149
b. Washington v. Twitter
Following the 2018 settlements, Washington’s 2019 local elections were the
first major test of the state’s commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model now
that it had become unambiguously clear that the disclosure requirements applied to
online commercial advertisers.150 Twitter escaped scrutiny the prior year, but faced
a complaint filed on October 30, 2019,151 serendipitously the same day the company
announced a platform-wide ban on political advertising.152 Like the prior Google
and Facebook cases, the complaint alleged that Twitter had failed to comply with
Washington’s commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model and had not made
records of political ads available for public inspection.153 And, like the previous
cases, Twitter settled before the case went to trial, paying a total of $100,000.154
However, unlike prior settlements, Twitter did not deny the allegations in the state’s
case.155 In addition, through the course of its investigation, the Public Disclosure
Commission discovered that Twitter had, following the company’s ban on political
145

Stipulation and Judgement at 2, Washington v. Facebook, Inc., King County Superior Court
(Dec. 18, 2018).
146
Stipulation and Judgement at 2, Washington v. Google, LLC, King County Superior Court
(Dec. 18, 2018).
147
Google, GOOGLE, Updates to Political Content Policy (June 2018), https://support.
google.com/adspolicy/answer/9039396?hl=en&ref_topic=29265.
148
See infra., Note 183.
149
Facebook, FACEBOOK, New Rules for Ads That Relate to Politics in Washington State, Dec.
27, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/business/news/new-rules-for-ads-that-relate-to-politics-inwashington-state.
150
Along with the 2018 Facebook and Google settlements, Washington regulators amended
disclosure rules to more clearly encompass online political advertising in 2018. See Engrossed
Substitute House Bill 2938 (2018) and Public Disclosure Commission, New Law Means Changes
to Campaign Finance Requirements and Complaint Process,
https://www.pdc.wa.gov/ESHB_2938_news.
151
Public Disclosure Commission Case #59521. See disclosure in star note.
152
Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter-political-ads-ban.html.
153
Public Disclosure Commission Case #59521.
154
Stipulation and Agreed Judgement, Washington v. Twitter, Inc., King County Superior
Court 20-2-15134-3 (Oct. 12, 2020).
155
Twitter, however, did not “waive for future contention its contention that RCW 42.17A.345
and WAC 390-18-050 are preempted by federal law,” a contention similarly raised by Facebook
and Google.
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advertising, apparently accidentally deleted key payment-related portions of its
political advertising records,156 an enforcement discovery which would not have
been possible without the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model.
c. The 2020 and 2021 Cases
In the lead up to the 2020 presidential election, 2019 local elections served as
the first meaningful test of Facebook’s political ad ban in Washington. Despite their
self-imposed ban, Facebook apparently continued to sell political advertising in
Washington.157 In April 2020, the Washington State Attorney General again filed
suit against Facebook, alleging they had once again failed to meet the requirements
of the state’s campaign finance disclosure laws.158 As of this writing, the case is
scheduled to go to trial in early 2022.159
Alongside the case against Facebook, the Washington Attorney General’s
office filed suit against Google in early 2021.160 Like the prior suit against Google,
described above, the suit here revolves around Google’s alleged failure to properly
and fully disclose information related to political advertising sales in
Washington.161 Specifically, the suit alleges that Google failed to maintain records
of nearly $500,000 in political advertising sales to more than 50 candidates and
committees between 2018 and 2019.162 In June of 2021 Google agreed to pay more
than $420,000 to settle the case without conceding that Washington’s commercial
156
See Public Disclosure Commission Twitter Referral Letter (noting that an “engineering
issue” had caused Twitter to “destroy[] records relevant to the inquiry,” including billing
information for political advertising purchases and “complete sponsor addresses, payment dates,
and demographics of audiences targeted and reached” for the ads), https://pdc-case-tracking.s3.usgov-west-1.amazonaws.com/3349/PDC%20Case%2059521%20%28Twitter%20Inc.%29%20%20Referral%20Letter%20to%20AGO_FINAL.pdf.
157
David Gutman, Facebook and Google Agreed to Stop Selling Political Ads in Washington
State, But They are Still Doing It, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.seattle
times.com/seattle-news/politics/despite-promising-to-stop-facebook-and-google-are-still-sellingpolitical-ads-in-washington-state.
158
Jim Brunner, Washington AG Ferguson Sues Facebook Again, Saying It’s Still Selling
Political Ads without Adequate Disclosures, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-ag-ferguson-sues-facebook-again-saying-itsstill-selling-political-ads-without-adequate-disclosures.
159
See Joint Stipulation and Order Amending Case Schedule, Washington v. Facebook, Inc.,
King County Superior Court 20-2-07774-7 (Sept. 29, 2021). While the case is still outstanding, it
is a fascinating combination of rejected settlements, allegations of intentional violations, claims of
Section 230 immunity and federal preemption, and other issues that each sit at the center of the
conversation about how we should and should not regulate large technology companies and how
they influence politics and society. See Eli Sanders, Welcome to Wild West!, WILD WEST, Sep. 21,
2020, https://wildwest.substack.com/p/welcome-to-wild-west (announcing a new online publication
dedicated to the case and issues related to it, and describing the case history and some of the
intersections).
160
Washington State Office of the Attorney General, “AG Ferguson Files Lawsuit Against
Google for Repeatedly Violating Washington Campaign Finance Law,” Feb. 24, 2021,
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-files-lawsuit-against-google-repeatedlyviolating-washington-campaign.
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Id.
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advertiser statutes and regulations applied to the company.163
2. Washington Post v. McManus
In 2018, Maryland legislators, concerned that foreign actors and others had
improperly influenced the 2016 elections through digital advertising, decided to
act.164 By May of 2018, the legislature had passed Senate Bill 875, establishing a
commercial-advertiser-based disclosure regime in Maryland.165 On July 1, the law
came into effect, and by mid-August a group of eight newspaper publishers and one
press association had brought suit seeking to enjoin enforcement and unravel
Maryland’s new commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model.166
Like other commercial-advertiser-based disclosure structures, Maryland’s law
required commercial advertisers to make records of ad purchases available to the
public and regulators.167 These required records included copies of advertising,
costs of that advertising, purchaser information, and information about when the ad
ran.168 Maryland’s law, however, varied in two important ways. First, unlike other
versions of the commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model, Maryland’s new
law only required disclosure from sellers of “qualifying paid digital
communications” rather than all commercial advertising.169 Second, in what the
District Court considering the law called the “publication requirement,” 170 the law
obligated commercial advertisers to post copies of the required disclosures on their
own websites.171
Newspaper publishers, concerned that the “publication requirement” was a
form of compelled speech that infringed on the freedom of the press, brought a
challenge to the law.172 The District Court agreed, finding that the law “compels
online publishers to post state-mandated information on their own websites” in
likely violation of First Amendment protections.173 The court noted that even “[t]he
163
Washington State Office of the Attorney General, “AG Ferguson: Google Will Pay More
Than $423,000 Over Repeated Violations of Washington Campaign Finance Law,” June 17, 2021,
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-google-will-pay-more-423000-overrepeated-violations-washington. See also Stipulation and Agreed Judgement, Washington v.
Google, LLC, King County Superior Court 21-2-02549-4 (June 16, 2021).
164
Maryland Senate Bill 875 Enrolled (2018). See also Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F.
Supp. 3d 272, n. 6 (D. Md. 2019) (describing testimony on the purpose and intent of Senate Bill
875).
165
Maryland Senate Bill 875 Enrolled (2018).
166
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F.
Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019).
167
See Maryland Senate Bill 875 Enrolled (2018).
168
Id.
169
As enacted defines “qualifying paid digital communication” as “any electronic
communication that: is campaign material; is placed or promoted for a fee; is disseminated to 500
or more individuals; and does not propose a commercial transaction.” Maryland Senate Bill 875
Enrolled (2018) (internal formatting and punctuation omitted).
170
Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 282-83.
171
See Maryland Senate Bill 875 Enrolled (2018).
172
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 3, Washington Post v. McManus,
355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019).
173
Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F.Supp.3d at 300.
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veritable infiniteness of cyberspace does not cure this constitutional infirmity”
presented by the law.174 Holding that strict scrutiny applied and that, while the law
involved a compelling state interest, the law was not narrowly tailored, the District
Court enjoined enforcement of the law while also allowing for the possibility of an
interlocutory appeal.175
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reconsidered the application of strict scrutiny and
the constitutional implications of the “publication requirement.”176 Describing the
law as a “collection of First Amendment infirmities” and “a legislative scheme with
layer upon layer of expressive burdens, ultimately bereft of any coherent
connection to an offsetting state interest,” the court found that the law failed to
survive constitutional scrutiny.177 Crediting the aims of the Maryland legislature,
the court nonetheless found the law did not appropriately strike a balance between
free speech interests and transparency interests.178
Rather, the Fourth Circuit supported the district court’s conclusion that
Maryland’s law was a “content-based regulation on speech” that “singles out
political speech.”179 Describing the district court’s discussion of the issues as
“lengthy and thoughtful,” the Fourth Circuit held that the law is “content-based,
targets political expression, and compels certain speech.”180 However, the court
recognized, “Maryland’s law is different in kind from customary campaign finance
regulations because the Act burdens platforms.”181 That is, in contrast to laws like
the one in question in Buckley, Maryland’s law places the burden of disclosure on
commercial advertisers rather than direct participants in the political process.
Therefore, the law “creates a constitutional infirmity distinct from garden-variety
campaign finance regulations” as “when the onus is placed on platforms, we hazard
giving government the ability to accomplish indirectly via market manipulation
what it cannot do through direct regulation—control the available channels for
political discussion.”182 This potentially chilling control was not merely a
theoretical risk either; at least some commercial advertisers had stopped accepting
political advertisements in Maryland in the wake of the law coming into effect.183
Throughout, however, the McManus court treats the commercial-advertiser174
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Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter McManus].
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McManus, at 520, 523.
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Id. at 523 (describing the difficulty faced by states seeking to administer elections where
“[o]n the one hand, the marketplace of ideas resists governmental regulation. The First Amendment
guarantees that all citizens shall be free to speak their piece on the issues of the day, and that
government cannot meddle in the debate that takes place among the governed. On the other hand,
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179
Id. at 513. See also Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 285-88.
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Id. at 513, 515.
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Id. at 515 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 517.
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Id. at 516-17 (“the short history of Maryland’s law shows that these chilling effects are not
theoretical. Google, for instance, has already stopped hosting political advertisements in the state”)
(referencing Michael Dresser, Google No Longer Accepting State, Local Election Ads in Maryland
as Result of New Law, THE BALT. SUN (June 29, 2018)).
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based disclosures as if they were a form of political speech.184 Describing the
publication requirement as “aim[ed] directly at political speech,” the court found
the regulations were “of political speech [and] therefore ‘trench upon an area in
which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.’”185
Describing political speech as occupying “a distinctive place in First Amendment
law,” the court held the law failed to meet the needs of either exacting or strict
scrutiny.186 In finding the speech involved was political speech, the court points to
the District Court’s “lengthy and thoughtful” analysis finding the Maryland statute
regulated political speech.187 However, the District Court simply assumed, without
analyzing, that Maryland’s law regulated electioneering communications; further,
the Court further assumed that regulation of electioneering communications
through third-parties is subject to the same kind of scrutiny as regulation of
electioneering communications when those communications are the typical
political speech of candidates or committees, or that involved in contributions and
expenditures.188
III.

APPLYING CASE LAW TO THE WASHINGTON STATE MODEL

Applying campaign finance disclosure precedent to Washington’s commercialadvertiser-based disclosure law shows that the law, and commercial-advertiserbased disclosure laws generally, fit squarely inside the constitutional limits on
campaign finance disclosure rules. As described below, while it is unclear what
kind of speech the laws implicate, it is clear a commercial advertiser model,
properly understood, does not involve political speech by commercial advertisers
and does not directly relate to political speech by advertising purchasers. Similarly,
commercial advertiser disclosure laws do not place an unconstitutional indirect
limit on the political speech of advertising purchasers; while McManus suggested
Maryland’s iteration of the model placed some unconstitutional limit on speech,189
long-standing Supreme Court precedent on disclosure law assertively suggests the
opposite. Applying Buckley and related cases, it appears that commercial advertiser
disclosure requirements fit within the constitutional limits described by the
Supreme Court.
A. The Model Does Not Directly Involve Political Speech
Typical political speech involves the “discussion of candidates, structures and
forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be
operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.”190 Protections of
184

Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d at 513.
Id. at 513-14 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988)).
186
Id. at 513, 520.
187
Id. at 513.
188
Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 287 (finding the Maryland law “plainly”
implicates a form of speech which is “indisputably a form of political speech”).
189
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); see also, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
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political speech allow political actors to “spread [their] message” and ensure
“voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates and the campaign issues”
are able to do so.191 At its most basic level, political speech is “interactive
communication concerning political change.”192 These discussions “‘of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation’
of our system of government” and regulating such speech is thus necessarily
difficult.193 Political speech can also be symbolic.194 This kind of expressive and
symbolic political speech is applicable in campaign finance disclosure cases.195
In all cases, however, political speech is expressive.196 That is, for speech to be
political speech, it must express some opinion or preference held by the speaker or
symbolic speaker. That expressive, opinion-driven element of political speech is
what differentiates political speech from other forms of speech; while a journalist’s
expression of personal support for a candidate is surely political speech, the same
journalist’s description in the local newspaper of that candidate’s positions on an
important issue is does not have the expressive core of political speech.197
Political speech is one of a number of categories defined in First Amendment
jurisprudence.198 This categorical approach requires courts to “distinguish among
speech-suppressing regulations much the same way a biologist distinguishes among
organisms, identifying their most distinctive features and slotting each new species
into its proper genus.”199 Slotting speech into the wrong genus can potentially lead
to unanticipated restrictions on speech which ought to be allowed and protections
of speech which ought not be protected.
Unlike the political speech addressed in Buckley and other campaign finance
disclosure cases, the speech at question in commercial advertiser disclosures is not
expressive. Where prior cases addressed the disclosure of contributions, the kind of
88, 101-102 (1940) (“freedom of speech . . . embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment”).
191
Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989).
192
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988).
193
Ark. Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 423 U.S. at 14).
194
See Buckley v. Valeo, 423 U.S. at 21 (describing financial political contributions in terms
of a “symbolic expression of support”).
195
Id. See also McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185, 196-97 (2014)
(describing Buckley’s symbolic expression); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(suggesting the core of First Amendment protections sit at the “free debate and free exchange of
ideas” which ensures “that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful
change is effected”); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (insisting that the expenditure of funds
in service of speech does not itself “make the speech any the less an exercise of First Amendment
rights”).
196
See Buckley, 423 U.S. at 21 (describing contributions, as the act of symbolic speech, as “a
general expression of support for the candidate and his views”).
197
The description of the position may still deserve First Amendment protection, but that
protection is not rooted in political speech.
198
Other categories include, e.g., commercial speech and “the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942).
199
Washington Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 285.
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disclosures implicated in commercial advertiser laws involve only information
about a commercial transaction between a commercial advertiser and an advertising
purchaser where that purchaser is a political actor. And, unlike the symbolic speech
in Buckley and related cases, the transaction does not flow from a supporter to a
political actor. Instead, the transaction flows from a political actor to a “neutral
third-party platforms rather than [a] direct political participant.”200
The commercial-advertiser-based disclosure rules considered here are
fundamentally different from disclosure requirements imposed on candidates and
committees. However, commercial advertiser disclosures are different from other
requirements because they are further from the expressive core of political speech.
That is, speech about political speech is less clearly within the bound of exacting
scrutiny. Rather than regulations directly impacting the expressive core of political
speech,201 commercial-advertiser-based disclosure rules only directly involve
speech about political speech and thus these laws do not easily fit within the same
category as regulations more directly affecting candidates and committees or
political speech. However, this tension and difference, itself recognized by the
McManus court,202 is not simply a minor shift from one kind of candidate disclosure
requirement to another. Neither is it like the difference between expenditure limits
and contribution limits. The difference arises because commercial-advertiser-based
disclosure models do not directly implicate political speech at all. Implicitly, longstanding statutes and regulations on political advertising recognize that political
advertisements sold and run by broadcasters are not themselves the political speech
of the broadcasters.203 In the same way, commercial advertiser disclosures and the
information contained in them simply are not expressive of any political position
and are not a symbolic expression of support or opposition to any matter “relating
to the political process.” Despite the close connection between commercial
advertiser disclosures and the political advertising they relate to, the disclosures
themselves are not and cannot be political speech.
B. The Model Does Not Infringe on the Political Speech of Advertising Buyers
Determining that commercial advertiser disclosure laws do not directly
implicate political speech does not end an inquiry into their validity. There is still
the potential that the laws may indirectly limit the rights of third parties, in this case
including candidates, committees, and contributors. However, even to the extent
that these laws have an impact on third parties, commercial advertiser disclosure
laws do not present an unconstitutional bar on the political speech of third parties.
Like most campaign finance disclosure laws, commercial advertiser disclosure
laws may involve information provided by or about third parties who have neither
McManus at 512 (describing the District Court’s finding that the law “burden[ed] ostensibly
neutral third parties such as publishers of political advertisements.” Washington Post v. McManus,
355 F.Supp.3d 272, 293 (D. Md. 2019)).
201
See discussion supra Part III.A.
202
Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d at 515 (“Maryland’s law is different in kind from
customary campaign finance regulations because the Act burdens platforms rather than political
actors”).
203
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 315; 47 C.F.R. § 73.1943
200
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played a part in making the disclosure nor who have, in at least some cases, directly
consented to the disclosure. In the case of traditional campaign finance disclosures,
this third-party information is about contributors and recipients of expenditures.
Current federal law, for example, requires reports including information about any
person who has made a contribution in excess of a certain amount.204 These
requirements pose at least some hypothetical risk of creating an indirect limit on
political speech because they demand information about individuals who may face
some scrutiny as a result of the disclosure. This risk alone, however, does not
present an unconstitutional limit.205
Commercial advertiser disclosure laws present a different issue. Rather than
requiring information about the political speech of contributors, the disclosures
only require information about the relationship between the advertiser making the
disclosure and the candidate or committee purchasing the advertising.206 As
described above, that kind of disclosure does not directly involve political speech.
However, the Buckley line of cases does not limit itself to direct restrictions.207
Disclosure structures may also run up against constitutional limits where they
indirectly limit the rights of third parties not involved in the disclosure itself. In
more traditional disclosure models where candidates provide information to the
public and regulators about contributions and expenditures, those third parties are
individuals engaging in acts protected speech by making contributions. When
considering commercial advertiser disclosures, however, the third parties are not
individuals in general; instead, the third parties are the candidates and campaigns
who purchased the advertising described in the disclosures.
The difference in the kind of concerns raised by commercial advertiser
disclosure laws from the issues raised by disclosure laws in general is meaningful
here. The shift, however, simply moves the potential harms from unrelated third
parties to candidates. Or, in other words, the issues built into commercial advertiser
disclosure requirements are not driven by the political speech rights of the
commercial advertisers themselves, and they are not driven by the impact of the
disclosures on anyone other than candidates. The impacts are on candidates
themselves. There is already an easily available tool for exploring the impacts of
disclosure itself: Buckley and its related cases.
C. The Model is Constitutional
If commercial advertiser disclosure laws do not implicate political speech and
do not infringe on the political speech of advertising buyers and sellers, are there
any constitutional limits on commercial advertiser disclosure laws? Instead of
answering that question in the abstract, applying case law to an existing statute
provides a clearer path. Washington’s RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050
204

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A).
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64 (discussing third parties and the First Amendment
risks embedded in disclosure requirements and concluding that these risks do not create a
constitutional bar on disclosure rules); see also discussion supra Part II (discussing precedent on
disclosure rules).
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create the state’s commercial advertiser disclosure system and, particularly given
the limited number of states using a commercial advertiser disclosure model, are a
good tool for analyzing the issues.
1. Applying Buckley to Washington’s Law
In a general sense, Washington’s commercial-advertiser-based disclosure rules
bear a clear relationship to the “political file” disclosure rules considered in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, although they extend to included clear
requirements that commercial advertisers make a copy of the advertisement
available.208 In McConnell, the Supreme Court examined a federal requirement that
certain kinds of licensed broadcasters maintain public records containing
information on political advertising run by those stations.209 There, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a federal campaign finance regulation (alongside
a similar communications regulation) which required records of requests to
purchase political advertising by certain federal candidates, and where those
requests were granted, information on the cost and airtime of the advertising.210 In
other words, the Court considered a federal law that, with the exception of the
publication requirement, is almost directly analogous to a commercial-advertiserbased disclosure model. Examining the First Amendment implication of the record
keeping requirement, the Court found that “any additional burden that the statute,
viewed facially, imposes upon interests protected by the First Amendment seems
slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it serves.”211 At the
same time, the Court found that the disclosure requirements “must survive a facial
attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that
of heightened scrutiny.”212 While Citizens United later overruled portions of
McConnell, the portion describing and upholding advertiser disclosure
requirements remains good law.213 The exacting scrutiny described in Buckley and
Citizens United, or the similar heightened considered in McConnell, defines the
most stringent applicable standard for analyzing commercial advertiser disclosure
rules.
Applying the exacting scrutiny defined in McConnell requires an inquiry that
asks “whether there is a ‘sufficiently important interest’ and whether the statute is
‘closely drawn’ to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment

208
See McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. at 234-36 (describing broadcaster
regulations which require broadcasters to “‘keep’ a publicly available ‘file of records of all requests
for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office,’ along with a notation
showing whether the request was granted, and (if granted) a history that includes ‘classes of time,’
‘rates charged,’ and when the ‘spots actually aired’” (quoting 47 CFR § 73.1943(a)); c.f. supra notes
18-27 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
209
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. at 234-36.
210
Id. at 234-36.
211
Id. at 245.
212
Id. (define “heightened scrutiny” as a test which “ask[s] whether there is a ‘sufficiently
important interest’ and whether the statute is ‘closely drawn’ to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
First Amendment freedoms”); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232.
213
See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. at 366-71 (2010).
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freedoms.”214 These sufficiently important interests are most rationally understood
as reaffirming the interests described in Buckley; that is, the set of “sufficiently
important interest[s]” in McConnell must at least include the set of “sufficiently
important” interests identified in Buckley.215 When considering disclosure
requirements, these interests include an informational interest, an anticorruption
interest, and an enforcement interest.216
Commercial advertiser disclosures forward an informational interest by
ensuring voters have access to data about candidate and committee advertising.
Similar to the disclosures in Buckley, commercial advertiser disclosures provide
voters with information which is not otherwise accessible and also may provide
voters with information relevant to their voting choices.217 Commercial advertiser
disclosures on digital and microtargeted advertising may even provide voters with
information that is even less accessible and more relevant than the information
disclosures considered in Buckley were able to provide. For example, as
microtargeted advertising creates the potential that candidates could choose to
purchase different kinds of advertising with vastly different messages for different
constituent groups. Each of those groups would only ever see the limited
advertising the candidate defined and created to appeal to that group and only that
group, disclosures could provide information which could not be accessed in any
other way. Imagine, for example, a candidate who sought to purchase advertising
about policing policy and police violence within their community but was also
aware that their constituency was evenly split on the appropriate response. In order
to get the most possible votes, imagine the candidate creates and places two
different ads, one intended for each constituent group. And, by using microtargeting
and related advertising technology, the candidate tries to ensure that only
constituents likely to respond positively to an ad sees that ad. Members of the
constituent group likely to respond negatively to the ad are unlikely to ever see it.
Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosures, by requiring information
about advertising targeting and a copy of the advertising, strongly support the
voters’ informational interest, specifically as it relates to digital advertising and
through tools that are highly relevant to voters and voter choices. At least some
constituents would likely find the bifurcated advertising highly relevant to their
voting choices; if nothing else, some voters are likely to be concerned that the
candidate will not actually push for the policies they want the candidate to support.
Also, the specific information within the commercial advertiser disclosures is not
generally or readily available. Outside of the limited number of advertisers who
maintain the “political file” required by the FCC and directly considered in
McConnell, commercial advertisers do not typically furnish the kind of information
required by Washington’s structure. For example, while WAC 390-18-050 requires
digital advertisers to disclose information about the race “of audiences targeted and
reached” by digital advertisers,218 even relatively robust advertiser disclosure
214
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systems (like Facebook’s Ad Library) that exist outside of the required disclosure
models fail to provide information about the race of individuals targeted by political
advertising.219 In providing significant and extensive data about advertising to
voters, and particularly in providing voters with information about advertising
which they have not individually seen and would not individually see absent
commercial advertiser disclosures, Washington’s model furthers the Buckley’s
informational interest.
Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosure model also assertively supports
the state’s interest in enforcing campaign finance requirements, and particularly in
enforcing candidate disclosure requirements.220 Because candidate and committee
disclosures about advertising purchases operate as part of a system with only
limited checks, the check provided by commercial advertiser disclosures containing
additional information about all political advertising purchases, (even those not
reported in candidate and committee disclosures) allows the state to more
effectively enforce reporting and disclosure requirements. And, similar to how
difficult accessing the information outside of commercial advertiser disclosures
highlights the importance of those disclosures to the informational interest, the
difficulty or impossibility of easily accessing information about advertising
purchases absent required disclosure information highlights the importance of
commercial advertiser disclosures to the enforcement interest. That is, at least some
of the information necessary to enforce campaign finance and reporting
requirements is only available from commercial advertisers and is only available to
the degree that those advertisers are required to disclose it.
While the commercial advertiser model furthers the “significant” informational
and enforcement interests articulated in Buckley, the model is less able to directly
address the anticorruption interest. In the wake of McCutcheon’s unambiguous
limitation of the anticorruption interest to “quid pro quo” corruption,221 the
connection between commercial advertiser disclosures and the anticorruption
interest is even more tenuous. However, unlike contribution and expenditure limits,
the anticorruption interest is not and has never been the exclusive or primary
justification for the constitutionality of disclosure regimes. Rather, it has only
served as one of a series of interests which each separately and individually
articulate an important and potentially significant and substantial government
interest. Yet the anticorruption interest is also present in commercial advertiser
disclosure rules; just as the disclosure of contributions in Buckley helped to prevent
“actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large
contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity,”222 the disclosures in
Washington’s model help prevent the appearance of corruption by ensuring that
each contribution in support of a candidate is disclosed in at least some form.
Washington’s model provides the kind of “full disclosure” that “tends ‘to prevent
219
Facebook’s Ad Library currently supplies information about the age and gender of the
audience reached by advertising, along with broad location data. See https://www.facebook
.com/ads/library.
220
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the corrupt use of money to affect elections.’”223
While candidate disclosure models serve a valuable role in furthering important
interests, and particularly anticorruption interests, they cannot meet the same needs
or support the same goals as commercial advertiser disclosures. Candidate
disclosures cannot fulfil the enforcement role of commercial advertiser disclosures
because commercial advertiser disclosures function, among other things, as
enforcement checks on candidate disclosures. Candidate disclosures cannot meet
the same informational needs because the kind of information provided by
commercial advertiser disclosures is distinct from the kind of information available
to candidates and committees, and because candidate disclosures cannot provide
independent information about the accuracy of candidate disclosures, itself an
interest within the informational interest. And candidate disclosures cannot fully
meet the anticorruption interests furthered by commercial advertiser disclosures
because both types of disclosures are part of the “full disclosure” structure which
is most able to provide the public with the information necessary to detect and
prevent any corruption in the form of “post-election special favors that may be
given in return” for expenditures or contributions.224
Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosure structure fits neatly within the
interest boundaries outlined by Buckley and supported in McConnell and Citizens
United. This structure functions as a check on corruption and to provide voters with
additional and important information about campaigns and candidates and their
support. In this context, these commercial advertiser disclosure requirements “in
most applications appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of
campaign ignorance and corruption.”225 However, supporting the aforementioned
interests is not itself enough to meet the needs of the tests articulated in Buckley
and McConnell. The law in question must also be crafted to “avoid unnecessary
abridgment of First Amendment freedoms.”226 Because the potential abridgment
typically closely approaches the kind of political speech that sits at the core of the
First Amendment, potential burdens “must be weighed carefully against the
interests.”227
In addressing potential burdens involved in disclosure regimes, the Court has
not waivered: there are “no constitutional infirmities in . . . recordkeeping,
reporting, and disclosure” rules of the kind presented in Buckley. 228 The
commercial advertiser disclosure model is not, however, an example of these types
of rules. As the McManus Court recognized, a commercial advertiser disclosure
model is “different in kind from customary campaign finance regulations.”229
223
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Commercial advertiser disclosures are further away from core political speech than
“customary” regulations. The connection between commercial advertiser
disclosures and indirect infringements of First Amendment rights is more
attenuated than the connection between “customary” regulations and indirect
infringements.230 Where one connection is more distant and weaker than another,
it only makes sense to consider the standards applicable to the less attenuated
connection as the most stringent standards which apply to the more attenuated
connection. Thus, the standards for evaluating burdens considered in Buckley are
the strictest possible way to evaluate the burdens of Washington’s commercial
advertiser disclosure law under federal constitutional jurisprudence. When
addressing “reasonable and minimally restrictive” non candidate and committee
disclosure requirements, the Buckley Court found that not only do they not violate
the First Amendment interests of the discloser, but instead they “further[] First
Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system
to public view.”231 Or, applying the finding to Washington’s commercial advertiser
disclosure model, the model cannot present a burden on First Amendment rights
because not only does “the substantial public interest in disclosure” outweigh
harms,232 but full disclosure is in fact supportive of the values underlying the First
Amendment itself.
a. Narrow Tailoring and Americans for Prosperity Foundation
While Americans for Prosperity Foundation did not clearly hold that exacting
scrutiny applies in all compelled disclosure cases, the Supreme Court did impose a
narrow tailoring requirement on compelled disclosure laws wherever exacting
scrutiny does apply.233 While it is not clear how the narrow tailoring requirement
described in Americans for Prosperity Foundation differs in practice from the
careful weighing of interests already applicable when considering political
advertising disclosure cases, Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosure model
is narrowly tailored to the informational, enforcement, and anticorruption interests
described in Buckley. Unlike the California law addressed in Americans for
Prosperity Foundation, Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosure regime
does not impose a general filing or disclosure requirement, but instead only requires
the same kind of recordkeeping and on-request disclosure requirements as in
McConnell. The kind of data collection practices which created the “dramatic
mismatch” between the interests the state sought to promote and the disclosure
regime in Americans for Prosperity Foundation234 does not exist relative to
Washington’s law. Quite simply, Washington’s commercial advertiser disclosure
structure does not require (or even clearly allow) the state to collect any data from
commercial advertisers, and the state currently does not collect any such data.
Indeed, the “amount and sensitivity of the information harvested” by California was
230
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particularly concerning to the Court.235 However, under Washington’s disclosure
structure, the state neither harvests data nor is the data disclosed particularly
sensitive.236 Instead of potentially sensitive information about donor identities
collected as part of California’s scheme, Washington’s commercial-advertiserbased disclosure system exclusively reveals information about candidate spending.
In place of the broad data harvesting in the California scheme, Washington’s
commercial-advertiser-based disclosure system does not require or currently
involve data collection by government officials or regulatory agencies. Unlike the
California law considered in Americans for Prosperity Foundation (which required
all charities to file reports with the state), Washington’s commercial advertiser rules
do not apply to all advertisers, or even all commercial advertising sellers; rather,
the disclosure requirements only apply to those commercial advertisers who have
actually sold political advertising in the state. Similarly, Washington’s structure
only demands that those commercial advertisers disclose information about
political advertising they have sold and does not require them to disclose any
information about non-political advertising. California’s efforts to collect donor
information and the potentially chilling effects of that data collection, were
particularly concerning.237 However, Washington’s commercial advertiser
disclosure rules do not involve any disclosure of donor information; the
requirements are, like the McManus court described Maryland’s law, “different in
kind” from more traditional campaign finance or charitable disclosures in that they
do not include or consider information about donors or their activities. Indeed,
when looking at the specific concerns about the scope and tailoring of California’s
law the Court pointed to in Americans for Prosperity Foundation,238 Washington’s
commercial advertiser disclosure laws can easily be differentiated as more tailored:
the commercial advertiser disclosure requirements do not involve broad data
collection, the requirements only impose disclosure requirements on commercial
advertisers who have sold political advertising, and the required disclosures do not
involve information about donors.
2. Washington State Specific Concerns and Analysis
The Supreme Court of Washington has not directly addressed the commercial
advertiser disclosure requirements in RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050.
However, the Court has considered the constitutionality, both in state and federal
terms, of Washington’s disclosure regime in general. In considering the
constitutionality of the disclosure rules as applied to a political committee, the court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Washington’s disclosure structure.239 In doing
235
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so, the court did not rely on a new or unique test; instead, the principles and interest
versus burden balancing test articulated in Buckley and Citizens United defined the
standards applicable when considering the constitutionality of disclosure rules in
Washington courts.240 Though Washington-specific interests and ideas play a role
in working through the test,241 the test itself remains a requirement for “a
‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently
important’ governmental interest.”242 These state-level interests include the “right
of the electorate to know” information which may impact their voting decisions, a
right “no less fundamental than the right of privacy.”243 Indeed, the Supreme Court
of Washington has held that Article 1, Section 5 of the Washington State
Constitution, its free speech clause, does not provide “greater protection against
disclosure requirements than the First Amendment”244 and the “rights involved with
respect to the [prior spending limits imposed by Initiative 276] are derived from the
First Amendment.”245 In applying the Gunwall factors, the state’s interpretive tool
for determining when it is appropriate to resort to separate and independent state
constitutional grounds,246 the Supreme Court of Washington has regularly found no
greater speech protection in the state constitution than in the federal constitution.
Accordingly, the Court has applied the applicable federal analytical structure.247
Amendment of the United States Constitution, rather than Article 1 Section 5 of the Constitution of
the State of Washington to evaluate the constitutionality of a portion of Washington’s campaign
finance statutes and regulations); see also State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote
No! Committee, 135 Wash. 2d 618 (1998) (applying, again, the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution to analyze the constitutionality of a state campaign finance statute).
240
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241
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242
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guidelines under the federal constitution” to evaluate Article 1 Section 5 claims in the context of
commercial speech); Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash. 2d 103, 116-22 (1997) (describing
cases applying federal standards in the context of speech and applying the Gunwall factors to find
the state constitution provides no greater protections than federal protections in the context of time,
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Washington courts thus apply the same test as articulated in federal case law when
considering disclosure rules as federal courts.248
3. Distinguishing Washington’s Law from McManus
The law in question in McManus is distinguishable from Washington’s
commercial advertiser disclosure model. Maryland’s law involved a particularly
troublesome compelled speech (specifically compelled publishing) issue, while
Washington’s similar statutes and regulations compel no publication requirements
and do not involve the same kind of compelled speech considered in McManus.249
The significant compelled speech concerns embedded in Maryland’s version of the
commercial advertising disclosure models presented issues not present in an
analysis of Washington’s law.250 These compelled speech and compelled
publication issues in McManus are particularly potent and impactful because, as
has been considered in disclosure cases since Buckley, disclosure requirements
always and unavoidably run alongside compelled speech concerns. The compelled
speech concern is particularly clear because, in McManus, the court (perhaps
wrongly) considered the disclosure law as if it directly related to political speech.
That is, McManus hinges on a law which the court considered as if it involved the
compelled publication of political speech. With limited case law directly
considering the commercial-advertiser-based model, McManus seems likely to
draw outsized attention in future litigation about the model and related laws.251
Most disclosure laws, and in particular Washington’s commercial advertiser
disclosure law, do not include the kind of compelled speech key to McManus and
should be distinguished from that case’s fact-driven and statute-specific outcome.

place, and manner restrictions on nude dancing); In re Marriage of Suggs, 152 Wash. 2d 74, 80-81
(2004) (evaluating prior restraints using the federal standards). But c.f., Bering v. SHARE, 121
Wash. 2d 212, 234 (1986) (holding, without applying Gunwall factors, that Article 1 Section 5
requires that place restrictions on speech can only be imposed where there is a “compelling state
interest” rather than the federal requirement for a “significant governmental interesting); Collier v.
City of Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 763-65 (1993) (Durham, J., concurring) (criticizing Bering and
the majority in not applying the Gunwall factors). But see Robert F. Utter and Hugh D. Spitzer, THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION, 30 (2013) (Article 1, Section 5, the state’s free speech
provision, “is interpreted differently than the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” and free
speech is a “preferred right” which can be limited through “reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions” that are “content neutral . . . narrowly tailored to serve a state interest, and . . . leave
ample alternative channels of communication”).
248
See, e.g., Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 195 Wash.2d at 461-69.
249
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
250
Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d at 517-20.
251
Indeed, it already has started to impact cases in other circuits. See supra notes 46-48 and
Facebook Response to PDC Case #55351 at 5, https://pdc-case-tracking.s3.us-gov-west1.amazonaws.com/3145/55351%20Facebook%2C%20Inc.%20%285%29%20Response.pdf. See
also Eli Sanders, Washington Post v. McManus: Why a Case from Maryland Keeps Coming up in
Washington State, WILD WEST, Dec. 7, 2020, https://wildwest.substack.com/p/washington-post-vsmcmanus.
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CONCLUSION
Digital advertising is a growing part of the political advertising landscape, and
online behavioral advertising allows campaigns and candidates to reach voters in
unique ways. Regulation of digital political advertising typically follows one of two
models: a candidate or committee-based disclosure model, and a commercialadvertiser-based-disclosure model. While the former fits neatly within longstanding campaign expenditure disclosure rules and requirements, the later “is
different in kind from customary campaign finance regulations.”252 It shifts
disclosure requirements away from campaigns and candidates and to commercial
advertisers. Commercial-advertiser-based disclosure models, however, provide
significant benefits to constituents and other views of political advertising by
providing additional information and transparency. Similarly, they benefit
enforcers because commercial-advertiser-based disclosures provide confirmation
of otherwise required candidate disclosures. Neither the constituent nor
enforcement benefits of commercial-advertiser disclosures are available via a
candidate and committee-based disclosure model. These benefits allow
commercial-advertiser-based disclosure models to more effectively and fully match
up with the state interests underlying campaign finance disclosure rules,
particularly relative to candidate-based disclosure models.
Case law analyzing commercial-advertiser-based disclosure models is limited.
Nonetheless, disclosure and campaign finance cases in general provide some
guidance as to the constitutionality of the approach, and the Supreme Court’s
limited look at more limited political advertising disclosures in McConnell offers
some support for the constitutionality of the model in the abstract. In addition, while
the recent Americans for Prosperity Foundation decision clearly requires narrow
tailoring in compelled disclosure cases, Washington’s existing commercial
advertiser disclosure laws appear to already meet those narrow tailoring
requirements. Though a recent case addressing Maryland’s version of a
commercial-advertiser-based disclosure model suggests that such models may, in
at least some cases, be unconstitutional, that case also hinges on significant
compelled speech and publication issues embedded in Maryland’s law. Applying
existing campaign finance and disclosure precedent to Washington’s version of the
commercial-advertiser-disclosure model, which does not include the compelled
speech concerns present in Maryland, leads to a different outcome: one that is
consistent with both federal and state Supreme Court precedent. Commercialadvertiser-based disclosure models are constitutional and can play a meaningful
role in providing information to voters, particularly in the context of digital political
advertising.
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Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d at 515.

